In the realm of network security, one of the more insidious techniques used by attackers is the **Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)** attack. When combined with a method known as **SSL stripping**, this tactic can downgrade what should be a secure HTTPS connection into an unencrypted HTTP connection, effectively allowing the attacker to intercept and read data in plain text. At its core, **SSL stripping** exploits the fact that not all websites strictly enforce HTTPS from the very beginning of a session. A typical user might type "example.com" into their browser, which first tries to connect over **HTTP**. Only after the server responds does the browser get redirected to **HTTPS**. It’s during this initial, unprotected handshake that an attacker can slip in. Imagine you're on a public Wi-Fi network — say, at a café. An attacker sets up a fake access point or uses tools like **Bettercap** or **Ettercap** to impersonate the router. This is the **MITM setup**, where all traffic between your device and the Internet is now routed through the attacker's machine. Once the attacker is in the middle, they employ **SSLStrip** — a tool that intercepts HTTPS requests and modifies them in real-time. When you try to access `https://example.com`, the attacker strips the HTTPS and downgrades the connection to `http://example.com` before passing it to the server. The server responds as usual, but now the communication between your browser and the attacker is over **plain HTTP**, while only the attacker's connection to the website remains encrypted. Here’s a simple example of how SSLStrip might be run using **Bettercap**, a modern and powerful network manipulation tool: ```bash sudo bettercap -iface wlan0 ``` Inside the Bettercap interactive shell, the attacker could run: ```bash set arp.spoof.targets 192.168.1.105 # victim IP set arp.spoof.internal true set net.sniff.verbose true set http.proxy.sslstrip true arp.spoof on http.proxy on ``` Once enabled, any attempt by the victim to visit an HTTPS site — say, logging into a bank — would appear to work normally. But in reality, the attacker is viewing the login credentials in real-time, since the data is no longer encrypted in transit from the victim’s device. What makes **SSL stripping particularly dangerous** is how subtle it is. The victim may not notice the missing HTTPS lock icon — especially on mobile or if they’re in a hurry — and by the time they realize, it may already be too late. However, modern browsers and websites are **fighting back**. Features like **HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security)** tell browsers to always connect over HTTPS, even if the user types `http://`. Additionally, browser warnings for "not secure" pages are becoming more prominent. Still, many legacy systems and improperly configured servers remain vulnerable. That’s why **network security hygiene** — such as using VPNs on public networks and never ignoring HTTPS warnings — is essential for protecting yourself from these kinds of attacks.